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THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
HIRED MATERNITY*
WILLIAM JOSEPH WAGNER

THE FIRST INSTANCE OF HIRED maternity, a practice often misleadingly
termed "surrogate motherhood," occurred in the United States at
the end of the 1970's, that is, at about the time Louise Brown, the
world's first "test-tube" baby, was born in England.' But, the new
reproductive arrangement touched public awareness only with the
news of an event that followed nearly a decade later. On May 5,
1986, five armed law-enforcement officers appeared at a blue-collar
home.in Brick Township, New Jersey, to take a five-week-old infant,
by all necessary force, from the arms of its lactating natural mother.2

The news reports of this preliminary step in the enforcement of a
hired maternity contract against Mary Beth Whitehead and of her
subsequent flight with her child brought the arrangement to the
attention of the public.
In observing Whitehead's confrontation with the law, the American

people were given a glimpse of the force of law directed against what
is probably the most primordial of human ties: a mother's bond with

her nursing child.' To viewers conversant with the history of moral
issues in American law, the vision of Whitehead's attempted flight
was eerily reminiscent of Eliza's desperate flight with her child across

Copyright 1990 William Wagner. This article grew out of an address delivered
at a conference sponsored by the Pope Paul VI Institute for the Study of Human
Reproduction, Omaha, Nebraska, October 28-30, 1988. I would like to thank my
student research assistants, Patricia Jehle and Christine Bianchine, for their invaluable help in the preparation of the present article.
1. Louise Brown was born on July 25, 1978. D. Demarco, In My Mother's
Womb (1987), p. 143. Richard Levin of Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., of
Louisville claims to have brokered the first "publically proclaimed case of contractual
surrogate parenting" in 1979. Testimony of Richard Levin before the House Subcommittee on Transportation, Tourism, and Hazardous Materials, October 15, 1987.
2. See generally "The Fierce War of Longing Over Baby M," Washington
Post, October 14, 1986, p. E4, col. 4.
3. In the pre-trial phase of litigation, the Superior Court issued an ex parte
order calling for the forcible removal of the child from Mary Beth Whitehead,
pending the outcome of the contract action. In the trial-level decision, the judge
upheld the validity of the contract and ordered specific enforcement against Whitehead. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987).
*
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the ice floes of the Ohio in Uncle Tom's Cabin.4 The enforcement
of an alleged legal obligation appeared to violate the traditional
notions of natural moral duty that had inspired Harriet Beecher
Stowe. The discomfort caused by this dissonance was not to be
assuaged by treating Whitehead's difficulties as the outcome of a
purely private moral choice. Among the innovations of the "new
reproductive technologies," hired maternity at least was not amenable
to being treated under the rubric of privacy. The Whitehead case
involved a public dispute between adults who hardly knew each
other, over who had the right to rear a child. Whether by positive
intervention or passive acquiescence, the legal system could only be
implicated.
Even as "Baby M" fades from memory, lines are being drawn in
a contest o'~er the proper legislative response to hired maternity.5
This article seeks to contribute to an ethically sound public policy
position on that response. Sharply defined questions of morality are
rarely the only component of sound public policy, but in some
matters they are inextricably one such component. Such is the case
in the matter of hired maternity. In seeking to evaluate the ethics of
public policy on the question, this article's focus is not the ethics of
the practice of hired maternity per se, but rather the ethics of the
law's response to that practice. The article, nonetheless, takes as its
initial point of departure the ethics of personal decision.
An ethical assessment of personal choice provides a relevant
foundation for the ethics of lawmaking in this area for several
reasons. If personal choices can be shown to undermine public
morality, this may be a ground for legal restriction of private activity.
Conversely, where public morality is not involved arguments about
the morality of the law's response are, still, easier to validate, if the
morality of personal decision is clearly outlined and distinguished.
Finally, the ethical horizon of personal decision, in an area as basic
as the formation of familial relationships, is relevant to defining the

4. H.B. Stowe, Uncle Tom's Cabin, in Stowe, Three Novels (The Library of
America ed., 1982), pp. 78-80.
5. According to the National Committee for Adoption which monitors legislative
activity on this question, as of June 17, 1988, fifty-nine bills or resolutions on hired
maternity had been introduced in twenty-seven states. Twenty-seven would have, to
one degree or another, prohibited the practice and eighteen would essentially have
permitted it. Fourteen would have created a committee to study the issue. As of
June 17, 1988, at least sixteen states had enacted some form of response to the
problem. National Committee for Adoption, 1988 State Legislative Activity Regarding "Surrogate Parenting" (June 17, 1988).
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vision of the good society which it should be the law's objective to
further.
If an effective exploration of the ethics of the civil law's response
to the practice of hired maternity is to occur, the abstract analysis
of the personal ethics of hired maternity must at a certain point give
way to a statement of the generic goals that ethics can be said to
establish in the area for lawmaking as such. Clarity about the
appropriate moral purposes of law mediates between more abstract
moral principles and the concrete demands peculiar to making of
laws on a concrete issue. Here, the development of such a statement
is an intermediate step towards the article's ultimate goal of evaluating
the soundness of available legislative alternatives for responding to
hired maternity. In its final section, the article then turns to such an
ethical evaluation of four legislative alternatives now emerging in the
United States as possible responses to hired maternity. These include:
(1) prohibition; (2) decommercialization; (3) approval with
governmental validation; and (4) approval with private ordering
validation.
THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HIRED MATERNITY,
As AN OBJECT OF PERSONAL DECISION

The morality of a practice can be assessed within any of a number
of ethical frameworks. The framework, in the present article, is one
of natural law reasoning grounded in the Catholic tradition. As it is
avowedly Catholic, it will rely on the moral terms set out in the well
publicized Vatican document, the Vatican Instruction on Respect for
Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation
(hereinafter Vatican Instruction).6 In many ways, the article's ethical
vantage is more philosophical than theological in nature. Its framework
is intended to be of general application. And, its conclusions are
addressed to all in the political community.
The Vatican Instruction employs three separate but complementary
moral terms, in its response to hired maternity. It concludes that a
6. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for
Human life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain
Questions of the Day, reprinted in Pope John XXIII Medical-Moral Research and
Education Center, Ethics & Medics (Supp. April 1987), p. 20 [hereinafter Vatican
Instruction]. The Vatican Instruction has a certain extrinsic authority for Catholics,
as an expression of the teaching office of the Church. Its content is recognized as
an authentic, if limited, expression of the Catholic moral tradition and as such has
a certain intrinsic persuasiveness. For both reasons, it is a convenient point of
departure for articulating a Catholic response to the new reproductive technologies.
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personal decision to participate in hired maternity cannot be morally
sanctioned, because it is violative of (1) certain basic goods, (2)
certain essential personal duties, and (3) certain essential rights of
others. 7 The goods implicated include the "unity of marriage" and
the "dignity of the procreation of the human person." ' The duties
compromised are the mother's duty to her child ("maternal love"),
her duty of fidelity to her spouse ("conjugal fidelity"), and her duty
to her own integral fulfillment ("responsible motherhood"). 9 The
rights violated include the child's "right ... to be conceived, carried
in the womb, brought in the world and brought up by his parents"' 0
and the family's right not to be divided "between the physical,
psychological and moral elements which constitute [it].""
The Vatican Instruction appears to focus exclusively on the choices
of the woman who decides to alienate her maternity.' 2 The woman's
decision, in a sense, serves to make the arrangement possible, so that
this focus is not entirely inappropriate. The plight of the gestational
mother ought not to be romanticized. At the same time, no framework
for evaluating the morality of personal decision in the context of
hired maternity can be considered complete unless it allows for ethical
evaluation of the choices of the genetic father who conceives a child
in a hired maternity arrangement, or unless it permits similar evaluation
of the decisions of the commissioning party who has no genetic
relationship to the prospective child but who orchestrates the
conception through the acquisition of gamete(s) from third-party
donor(s).
7. The conceptual division among goods, duties, and rights, which this article
relies upon is implicit rather than explicit in the Vatican Instruction. The Vatican

Instruction's rather terse statement on hired maternity reads, in its entirety, as
follows:
Is "Surrogate" Motherhood Morally Licit?-No, for the same reasons which

lead one to reject heterologous artificial fertilization: for it is contrary to the
unity of marriage and to the dignity of the procreation of the human person.
Surrogate Motherhood represents an objective failure to meet the obligations
of maternal love, of conjugal fidelity and of responsible motherhood; it offends

the dignity and the right of the child to be conceived, carried in the womb,
brought into the world, and brought up by his own parents; it sets up, to the
detriment of families, a division between the physical, psychological and moral
elements which constitute those families.
Vatican Instruction, p. 20.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
love,"

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
The Vatican Instruction refers only to violations of "obligations of maternal
omitting reference to parallel obligations of paternal care. Ibid.
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The culpability of the commissioning party, whether the genetic
father or someone else, may be compounded by an object that is
not within the intention of the natural mother at all, and, thus, is
not within the framework of moral analysis expressly contemplated
by the Vatican Instruction. The commissioning party may intend to
use and, perhaps, even to coerce the mother, in a manner violative
of her dignity as a human person. My frame of reference for
evaluating the ethics of hired maternity, unlike the Vatican Instruction,
extends to this latter dimension of the choices of the genetic father
or other commissioning party.
HIRED MATERNITY VIOLATES BASIC HUMAN GOODS

THE UNITY OF MARMAGE
Assuming that the commissioning party is the genetic father and
is married to another woman, the practice of hired maternity violates
the unity of his marriage, since, in relation to the commissioning
couple, the result is genetically asymmetrical reproduction. 3 If the
gestational mother is married to another man, then the arrangement
violates the unity of her marriage for the same reason. Her action
is objectionable because she actualizes her procreative power to create
a child benefitting a marriage other than her own, his because he
diverts the resources of his household to rearing a child whom he
has deliberately chosen to conceive with one other than his wife.
Proponents of hired maternity assert that there is no violation of
the respective marriages of the two individuals who contribute
genetically to the conception of the child, because they share no
venereal pleasure. This argument misconstrues the opprobrium
historically attached to adultery in nearly all cultures. If anything,
illicit sharing in extramarital pleasure has been a secondary ground
13. The concept of marriage as a union of "one flesh" derives from the Genesis
account of creation (Gen 2:24) and is appropriated by the New Testament (Matthew
19:4-6; Mark 10:5-8; Ephesians 5:31). The concept is a standard point of reference
in magisterial teaching on Christian marriage. E.g., Vatican Instruction, p. 18. The
concept of matrimony operative in American law since the advent of no-fault divorce

departs considerably from this ideal. See H. Clark, 1 The Law of Domestic Relations
in the United States (1987), pp. 68-81 [hereinafter The Law of Domestic Relations].

Nonetheless, the concept of marriage within the American legal system remains one
founded on a morally distinctive, presumptively exclusive community of interest,
with roots in the Western and Christian traditions. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381.
U.S. 479 (1965). It is with this broader civil law notion of marriage, along with its
concomitant idea of family that hired maternity is in irreconcilable conflict.
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for condemning adultery. The evil generally seen as primary has been
illegitimate births whether within or outside the family unit, depriving
the innocent spouse of the exclusive opportunity to procreate with
his or her partner and, in the case of adultery by the wife, of
certainty as to which offspring are his.
Further, to the real extent that adultery is a betrayal of the affective
as opposed to the procreative dimension of marital unity, hired
maternity entails, in a certain sense, if not a pleasure bond, a bodily
union between the gestational mother and the genetic father who has
commissioned the pregnancy. Through the offices of a physician, his
semen enters her body, and through it she may share, for instance,
any venereal diseases from which he suffers. Women have become
14
infected with the HIV virus through artificial insemination by donor.
Inasmuch as she shares this communication and risk with a man not
her husband, the gestational mother can be said to violate the unity
of her marriage.
Before leaving the question of marital unity, it will be noted that
the violations of the unity of marriage implicit in hired maternity
have a novel feature. Persons can commit them without contributing
in any bodily way to the reproductive process. Parties commissioning
a hired maternity conception without contributing genetically to the
conception do so. In such cases, it would seem that the unity of
marriage is compromised in the more profound way because of the
greater disintegration reflected in the choice. It also bears stating
that every kind of violation of marital unity that the practice of
hired maternity makes possible is compounded, when money, either
as means or end, facilitates or induces the violation.
THE DIGNITY OF THE PROCREATION OF THE HUMAN PERSON

According to Catholic moral teaching and to the natural law
reasoning espoused here, human reproduction must meet at least
three requirements if it is to accord with the dignity of the human
person. The party who intends to reproduce must be willing to treat
the person procreated as an "end in him or herself" from the moment
14. Under present modes of artificial insemination by donor (AID), infection by
venereal disease is a distinct possibility. This danger is the more menacing in view
of the contemporary epidemic of acquired immune deficiency syndrome. "Artificial
Insemination and AIDS," Washington Post, Health Magazine., Jan. 5, 1988, p. 17,
col. 1 (Four Australian women infected with AIDS virus through AID). See generally
Mascola & Guinan, "Screening to Reduce Transmission of Sexually Transmitted
Diseases in Semen Used for Artificial Insemination," 314 New Eng. J. Med. (1986),
p. 1354.

WILLIAM JOSEPH WAGNER
that the possibility of procreation comes into view." The party
reproducing must be willing to assume a relationship of unconditional
parental loyalty to the person being procreated once that person's
life is conceived. 6 And, he or she must act within a relationship with
the one who provides the second gamete necessary for conception,
that adequately respects that person's dignity, which is to say, within
the marriage relationship.' 7 Hired maternity does not satisfy any of
these three requirements.
The requirement that the child conceived always be viewed as "an
end in him or herself" is violated when the natural mother makes
of the child an instrument to obtaining a medium of exchange not
even itself a basic good, i.e., money. Reciprocally, where one views
the transaction from the perspective of the commissioning couple
whose end it is to obtain the child, the conclusion remains unavoidable
that the child is "purchased" and a monetary value placed on a
human person. From this aspect, the child conceived is treated also
as an object rather than as an "end in him or herself."
Some argue that the alienation of motherhood in "surrogacy"
arrangements is not morally wrong where the act is truly donative,
because uncompensated beyond basic expenses and motivated by
altruism. This argument is not sound. Even on the terms stipulated,
the mother assumes a kind of dominion over the incipient human
person for the sake of the good of third persons (i.e., the
commissioning couple). The child is still being treated as a means
rather than as the end that morality insists that he or she always
remain. The fact that the end is, at least, the basic good of
"friendship" with a third party does not alter the intrinsic moral
evil of an act that reduces the child to a means.
15. The person's status as "end in him or herself" is expressed theologically as
being made "in the image of God." Vatican Instruction, p. 9. Respect to a human
life is, on this basis, owed from the moment of conception. Ibid., p. 10. It is owed,
in an anticipatory way, from the moment the couple contemplates the marital act,
since the procreation of another being is deemed to be an intrinsic, indefeasible
aspect of the meaning of sexual intercourse. Pastoral Constitution on the Church
in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes) (1965), reprinted in The Documents of
Vatican II (W. Abbott & J. Gallagher eds. 1966), p. 253, [hereinafter Pastoral
Constitution] and Paul VI Humanae Vitae 60, Acta Apostolicae Sedis 481, sec. 12
pp. 488-89 (1968).
16. Procreation is understood in the Catholic tradition as more than merely
transmitting life to a child, rather it is understood to mean both giving biological
life to and rearing the child to maturity. Having given life to the child, the parent
has the duty and the right to rear it. Pastoral Constitution, p. 254.
17. Vatican Instruction, pp. 14-15. The spouses are required to treat one another
as ends-in-themselves and with unconditional loyalty, which means marriage is
exclusive and indissoluble. PastoralConstitution, p. 254.

194

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990)

The second requirement established by respect for the dignity of
the procreation of the human person-unconditional parental loyaltyis compatible with an intent to terminate the parental relation only
where the reason is the child's best interest. Some argue that the
termination of parental rights by the gestational mother in hired
maternity arrangements is justified, because the voluntary termination
of parental rights in cases of adoption can be justified. This analogy
is misplaced. The action of a natural mother who yields her child
for adoption is morally justifiable because, through contingent events
over which she has failed to exercise sufficient control, she finds she
cannot adequately care for her child. Relinquishment is on the ground
of the child's best interest. By contrast, the termination of parental
rights in hired maternity arrangements is, at best, for the sake of
the third-party rather than for that of the child. As such, it violates
the parent's fiduciary duty of loyalty to her offspring. Agreements
to be bound in advance to deliver a child necessarily violate this
principle, since the gestational mother cannot know in advance
whether the commissioning couple will be fit to care for the child,
as of the future delivery date. The acceptance or conferral of money
as inducement to this breach of unconditional parental loyalty
obviously aggravates the wrong.
The third element required by respect for the dignity of the
procreation of the human person, marriage between the child's
biological parents, says that the violation of the unity of marriage
represented by hired maternity, discussed above, is simultaneously a
violation of the dignity of the person whose procreation is in prospect.
This covalence illustrates the essentially triadic nature of the
relationships at the core of the family.
HIRED MATERNITY VIOLATES ESSENTIAL MoRAL DuTIEs

As the Vatican Instruction suggests, the wrongfulness of hired
maternity can be further illumined by shifting the discussion from
basic goods to essential duties. The wrong under discussion may, in
fact, be substantially one and the same. Even so, the fuller scope
and meaning of the wrong becomes clear when the matter is considered
from this second aspect. From this vantage, the Vatican Instruction
specifies that hired maternity compromises three sorts of duties. They
are: (1) duty to child; (2) duty to spouse; and (3) duty to self.
Because I wish to expand the Vatican Instruction's frame of reference
to include the evaluation of the actions of commissioning parties, I
shall also extend my consideration to a fourth duty: (4) duty to
neighbor.
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DUTY TO CHID

The offense against the good of the dignity of the procreation of
the human person which hired maternity represents becomes concretely
a violation of a duty to the child once the child comes into being.
The Vatican Instruction rightly indicates that this duty is the very
opposite of the arm's length fairness characteristic of the market
place: it is the duty of unconditional love. The execution of a
promised performance to deliver over a child, under a contract signed
before his or her conception, is a violation of a morally prior duty
to the baby. Mary Beth Whitehead's change of heart, in this respect,
occurred within the locus poenitentiae.8 The gestational mother has
a moral duty to resist the enforcement of the contract even after she
has entered it. Such is not to say that she has a moral duty to refuse
to relinquish custody of the child. The moral evaluation of a decision
to relinquish custody would depend on her uncoerced judgment
respecting the child's best interest at the time of its birth.
DUTY TO SPOUSE
The violation of the good of marital unity which hired maternity
represents, when considered from the aspect of essential duties, is
seen also to entail the violation of duties owed by the participating
spouse to his or her marital partner. The unilateral disposal of one's
bodily powers of procreation by extramarital procreation, sterilization,
or abortion generally is to wrong one's spouse, who has a morally
cognizable interest in one's fertility. Where the disposal of these
powers results in asymmetrical procreation, either within or outside
of the family unit, the spouse, who chooses to procreate unilaterally,
simply wrongs his or her partner under this general principle in one
distinctive way. The duty in question can, more generally, be termed
that of marital exclusivity or monogamy. Hired maternity is, in
effect, a new form of polygyny or polyandry, the sort of arrangement
which heretofore has been prohibited under laws against bigamy and
polygamy. 9

18. This concept is recognized in law in the context of the exoneration flowing
from the timely abandonment of an illegal course of conduct. Town of Meredith
v. Fullerton, 83 N.H. 124, 139 A. 359 (1927).
19. See generally The Law of Domestic Relations, pp. 127-35. The constitutionality of such laws was upheld in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto 145)
244 (1878), but under contemporary trends it might be challenged.
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DUTY TO SELF

Each person has a duty to attend to his or her own integral selffulfillment.2° The actualization of the procreative powers through
hired maternity violates this obligation. In this regard, the analogy
which has been made between hired maternity and prostitution is
apt. The gestational mother, in such arrangements, makes a choice
to realize her powers of procreation in a way which leaves the
outcome disintegrated from either marriage or a relationship with
her child. In her experience of pregnancy and childbirth in particular,
the woman is alienated from her bodily experience of union with the
child developing within her, and, thus, necessarily is alienated even
from an integral experience of her body: her body says the child is
hers, but her intention says it is not. Her choice, like prostitution,
is objectively depersonalizing and degrading. The choice of the genetic
father is likewise one to procreate in a manner disintegrated from
marriage, although obviously not from relationship with the child.
The fact that he may be in a marriage with another woman, who is
willing to assume the rearing role with him, does not change the
fundamental disintegration implicit in the rejection of integral personal
fulfillment entailed in his choice of extramarital generation.
DUTY TO NEIGHBOR

The human person owes a duty to his or her neighbor not to
actualize his or her sexual and procreative powers in a manner
reducing the neighbor to a means rather than an end. This principle,
of generally uncontested validity with respect to the ethics of sexual
pleasure, is, perhaps, less widely acknowledged as applying to the
ethics of procreation. On this point, there is a definite need to
supplement the perspective provided within the Vatican Instruction.
In hired maternity, a woman is not treated as an end in herself, as
is a wife who becomes a mother through the unitive love of her
husband. Rather, she is treated as a "vessel" and as a "source" of
ova. She is treated as an instrument. Inducing her consent to this
role merely means eliciting from her her own participation in the
violation of her integral self-fulfillment in the domain of procreation
and sexuality. This serious wrong is the most public of the wrongs
involved in hired maternity. It is a wrong to which the feminist

20. T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.II. Q. 3, art. 1, pp. 595-96 (Eng. Dominicans trans. reprinted by Christian Classics, 1981) [hereinafter Summa Theologica].
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critique of hired maternity is rightly sensitive. 21 The wrong is only
aggravated when the commissioning party induces the mother to
violate her integrity in this fashion by means of monetary
compensation. Such payment can be thought of as the equivalent of
a bribe of an official to violate a non-defeasible duty.2 The use of
the coercive power of the civil law to compel the involuntary
performance of an agreement to terminate parental rights, under a
hired maternity arrangement, transforms the act of merely inducing
the mother to wrong herself, into what amounts to violence against
the integrity of the mother's relationship with her child.
Where the commissioning party has no parental rights in relationship
to the child based in genetics, the violation of the neighbor's personality
whether through his or her voluntary participation or through legal
coercion would seem the more culpable. In such a case, the conflict
of adult interests involved does not allow itself to be viewed as one
natural parent combating the other for the sake of the love of a
natural child. Instead, it can be understood only as the quest for
dominion over integral aspects of another's personality in order to
realize an abstract personal project. On the facts of the Stern/
Whitehead dispute, the wife of the sperm donor, among the adult
participants, probably stood, for this reason, in what objectively is
the most questionable ethical light. 23
HIRED MATERNITY VIOLATES EssENTIAL RIGHTS

THE RIGHTS OF THE CHnD
For the reasons given earlier, the practice of hired maternity
violates a parental duty to the child conceived. Focusing on the
wrong which either natural parent alone does to the child in this
kind of arrangement does not, however, exhaust the violation which
the arrangement signifies for the rights of the child. This is because
21. See generally G. Corea, The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies
From Artificial Insemination to Artificial Wombs (1986).
22. J. Noonan, Bribes (1984), pp. 683-706.
23. The wife of the sperm donor was deliberately excluded as a party to the
contract for the purpose of avoiding conflict with the New Jersey laws against child
selling. But, it was apparently her reluctance to accept the risks of pregnancy that
led the couple to undertake a hired maternity arrangement with Mary Beth Whitehead. Whitehead's realization that she did not wish to go through with the arrangement was triggered by the wife's attempts to control her behavior. Whitehead relates
that she felt that "Elizabeth Stern was trying to take over her life." "Who Keeps
'Baby M'?", Newsweek, Jan. 19, 1987, p. 49, col. 1.
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the child has a right to more than one parent can give alone. The
child has a right to a continuous relationship with a parental couple
which is grounded in unconditional commitment and which issues
forth in continuous personal-psychological love and nurturance. The
child also has the right to experience a convergence in his or her
social, genetic, and psychological identity. Hired maternity deprives
the child of this holistic unity of origin and rearing. The fragmentation
of the modern world has given rise to what Robert Jay Lifton has
identified as a crippling neurosis caused by discontinuity and
unconnectedness from elements of identity, such as those found in
the natural world and in preceding human generations. 24 As Leon
Kass illustrates, hired maternity represents an extreme example of
the modern fragmentation causing this painful psychic condition.2
Deliberately to deny a child continuity and connectedness with
conception, gestation, and rearing within a unified family counts as
the willing imposition of grave harm.
Proponents of the practice assert that the child does not have
rights that can be violated by the arrangement, since he or she was
not in being when the arrangement was agreed upon, and, indeed,
but for the arrangement would never have existed. In this view, the
child is better off because of the arrangement, since he or she exists
only because the arrangement occurred. One flaw in this argument
is that it presupposes that some net improvement in a person's
general welfare can justify a deliberate violation of that person's
human dignity. The argument would also serve to justify mercy
killing. Another flaw in the argument is that the wrong, in the first
instance, should be viewed as committed not against the child who
comes to be, but against the hypothetical rights of prospective
children whose procreation is in view when the arrangement is

contemplated .26
RIGHTS OF FAMILY

Some have faulted the Vatican Instruction for speaking of the
"rights of the family," on the ground that only individuals should
24. R. Lifton, The Life of the Self (1976) [hereinafter The Life of the SeI].
Lifton's theory grows out of his work on the survivors of Hiroshima. See R. Lifton,
Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima (1968). A well known practical application
of his theory that had legal ramifications is described in K. Erikson, Everything in
its Path: Destruction of Community in the Buffalo Creek Flood (1976).
25. L. Kass, Towards a More Natural Science (1985), pp. 110-15.
26. Karka, "Paradox of Future Individuals," 11 Phil. & Pub. Aff. (1981), pp.
93, 94.
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be deemed to have rights. But, this criticism reflects an unduly
individualistic and atomistic understanding of personal and social
relationships. Individual identity is itself inconceivable without some
definition through familial or other social relationships. Families and
even voluntary associations, thus, must be viewed as having moral
"rights" in an important sense. The Vatican Instruction asserts that
the practice of hired maternity violates at least one such right. This
is the family's7 right to "physical, psychological and moral" unity
2
and integrity.
This assertion is justified, and its importance and urgency become
apparent when one notes that hired maternity severs the necessity of
any link between marriage and procreative union, or between genetic
and rearing parentage. 28 In this regard, it exacerbates the
disconnectedness and discontinuity identified by Lifton as, perhaps,
the single greatest threat in our own era to human wholeness and
well being. 29 The harm threatened is not just for the children begotten
through hired maternity, but for everyone. The practice shatters the
organic meaning of "parent," "child," and "spouse," as it devalues
the currency of the received language of courtship, love, and
commitment, and of relations between men and women, as well as
of between adults and children. Were the practice generally
countenanced, it would make it more difficult to form or recognize
integral family relationships, even when by the natural resiliency of
human beings they appered as an option.
The ethical implications of hired maternity should be considered
unremittingly negative. There is no reason to suppose the practice
anything other than a regression in societal moral consciousness.
II.

A STATEMENT OF THE GENERIC PURPOSES WICH A
SOUND ETHICs PRESCRIBES FOR LAW MAKING
ON THE QUESTION OF HIRED MATERNITY

In the Catholic view, the fullness of moral obligation is enforceable
solely by God. The divine enforcement of moral norms is both

omniscient and omnipotent. It is tempered by divine wisdom and
mercy. As such, it largely transcends human comprehension and,
only by analogy, can be considered comparable to the enforcement
of human law. Within history, the Catholic tradition generally has
27. Vatican Instruction, p. 16.
28. Wagner, "The New Reproductive Technologies and the Law: A Roman
Catholic Perspective," 4 J. Contemp. Health L. & Policy (1988), p. 45.
29. The Life of the Self, supra note 24.
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assumed that such divine enforcement is operative, as one aspect of
natural law, in certain natural penalties that are the intrinsic outcome
of disordered conduct.30 Eschatologically, God is expected to add a
final divine judgment against sinners. According to representative
thinkers in the Catholic tradition such as John Courtney Murray and
Thomas Aquinas, one difference between the divine enforcement of
moral norms and the enforcement of such norms under human law
is the circumscribed scope of human law. 3' Through its sanctions,
human law does not and should not attempt to enforce morality per
se. It seeks only to effectuate the common good, by preserving, at
32
a minimum, public order, public morality, and justice.
If one is to arrive at a reliable statement of the generic goals for
lawmaking that ethics establishes in the area of hired maternity
arrangements, one must make clear at the outset that the eradication
per se of the immoral personal choices outlined above lies outside
the role of the civil law as understood within the Catholic tradition.
The practice of hired maternity should be outlawed for its immorality
no more than should the old Protestant Comstock laws against
contraceptives be revived simply because the Church teaches that
33
contraception is never morally admissible.
At a certain point, however, personal moral choices have public
moral implications. When this threshold is crossed, the legal response
to an emerging social practice itself becomes subject to moral
evaluation. For example, where the bad moral choices in hired
maternity can be shown to have a notoriety that undermines the
public moral health of society, the civil law may need to restrict
individual freedom to pursue such choices for the sake of what may
be called "public morality." On this basis, restriction on the

30. In Saint Thomas this penalty is understood in terms of a depravity of the
will. Summa Theologica, I.1I., Q. 91, art. 6, p. 1079. A Christian political philosopher like John Locke sees a pervasive disutility flowing from sinful action reflective
of God's will to reward virtue and punish vice. The Locke Reader (J. Yolten ed.
1979), p. 191.
31. Summa Theologica 1.11. Q. 95, art. 2, p. 1081; J.C. Murray, We Hold These
Truths (1960), pp. 155-174 [hereinafter We Hold These Truths].
32. 7 Declarationon Religious Freedom (DignitatisHumanae), reprinted in The
Documents of Vatican II (W. Abbott and J. Gallagher eds. 1966), p. 687.
33. The original Connecticut Comstock law against contraception, which was
overturned, as amended, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), was
originally 1879 Conn. Pub. Acts Ch. 78, and later Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 8568
(1949). Comstock also successfully lobbied the federal government for a law restricting contraception. The federal law enacted was found at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1461-62.
For a general discussion, see The Law of Domestic Relations, p. 362. For a discussion
from the Catholic perspective, see We Hold These Truths, supra p. 157.
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advertisement and brokerage of hired maternity arrangements would
be justified. Similarly, if it can be shown that the bad moral choices
involved in this practice erode society's "public order," they may be
curtailed by law. In the Catholic view and, indeed, in the AngloAmerican legal tradition, the institutions of marriage and the family
are the basic building blocks of the social order, that is to say, moral
realities to which fundamental reference must be made in any just
allocation of societal rights and duties.3 4 Hired maternity impairs the
order of these fundamental relationships. At a minimum, the state
must, therefore, withhold its enforcement mechanism from use as an
instrument effectuating such arrangements. This the law has
traditionally done, by treating contracts impairing familial relationships
as unenforceable and void as against public policy. 35 The law of
marriage and family, grounded as it is in equity rather than contract,
ought to remain the exclusive legal matrix for a constitutive order
of domestic relationships in the domestic sphere.
The law of marriage and family establishes certain formal requisites
for recognizing de facto human sexual and procreative relationships
as the basis of legally sanctioned rights and duties. De facto sexual
and procreative relationships standing alone do not constitute legally
cognizable marriage and family. Compliance with legal form is
necessary before societal recognition through law is warranted. Yet
such legal requirements may not be arbitrary. They receive their
normative direction from the natural givens of genetic and sexual
bonds.
Even when the civil law strikes a correct balance in this regard,
social practice will remain imperfect. Experience shows that some
number of couples become sexually involved outside of marriage and
some number of children are born out of wedlock. Such couples and
children ought to be seen as having certain legally cognizable natural
rights and duties, despite the absence of compliance with legal form
sufficient to create a cognizable marriage. 36 Conversely, where there
has been compliance resulting in a legal marriage, the state may,

34. From the perspective of the Catholic Church, see PastoralConstitution, pp.
257-58. For the principle in American law, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). An alternative way of
talking about the "public order" is to refer to the minimum requisites of a "vision
of the good society."
35. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts (1982), pp. 341-47.
36. For instance, under American constitutional law it is recognized that the
illegitimate child has a right to support from his or her natural parent. Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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under its parens patriae power, have to disregard the integrity of the
family thereby formed, for the sake of protecting unemancipated or
37
incompetent family members from abuse or neglect.
In the concrete situation, society can only escape from this dilemma
by making a judgment about which element it is more important to
stress under relevant circumstances. An integral family remains the
ideal, but under the imperfect conditions of human society, a legal
system may give greater weight either to compliance with legal form
or to de facto sexual and procreative relationships, as it recognizes
concrete claims. For example, it may give greater weight either to
the presumption of legitimacy that arises from the spouses' legal
marriage ceremony or to the natural rights of the genetic father,
where the mother's spouse is not the genetic father.18 While there is
a certain prudential latitude in deciding exactly how to strike this
balance, legal form ought not to be detached from underlying givens
of de facto sexual and procreative relationship, as fundamental
sources of normative direction.
In the context of the new reproductive technologies generally, and
of hired maternity in particular, alternative matrices have been
suggested as sources of the basic normative direction in the area of
domestic relations. These alternatives include: (1) the autonomous
intention of the individual, under liberal individualism; and (2)
positive conferral by the state, under theories giving overriding
importance to the sovereign command of government. Both are
currently proposed as substitutes for the normative direction, which
the inherent human moral significance of sexual and procreative
relationships has traditionally provided for law and social order.
In political terms, the law's response to hired maternity places at
issue the natural family as a viable subsidiary unit of society, which
is capable of resisting the degeneration of social life into either
individualism or collectivism. If the normativity of the intrinsic
structure of sex and procreation is sacrificed as the basis for
formulating rules on legally cognizable marriage and domestic rights
and duties, in favor of one of these stated alternatives, either the
market or the state can be expected to invade the sphere of intimate
human relations, ultimately at devastating human cost.
37. Under American law, a natural parent's rights may be terminated involuntarily because of unfitness or abandonment, as long as certain due process safeguards
are met. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982).
38. The Law of Domestic Relations, pp. 341-44. Compare Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion with Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Michael H. and
Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 160 S. Ct. 22.
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Ethically speaking, the law ought to embrace, as a fundamental
goal, the protection of the integrity of marriage and family, as these
basic institutions take shape within a normative matrix based on
natural sexual and procreative relationships. To succeed at this, the
law must do more than shelter concrete families already in being. It
must also seek to protect the common pool of intangible social terms
which makes the formation and survival of families possible. The
law. ought to preserve the currency of genetic relatedness and
covenantal commitment as societally meaningful terms, in order to
permit families to be formed and to flourish. On this ground, it may
prohibit commercial hired maternity which tends, in general, to
"poison the well" of social interaction between men and women and
parents and children.
In addition to protecting the family, the law has an equally
fundamental role in upholding the moral dignity of the human
person. Such recognition is a touchstone of the moral legitimacy of
any government. The law ought not, therefore, to sanction the
alienation of basic dimensions of personality, such as that involved
in peonage, slavery, or indentured servitude. 9 Neither should the law
allow -the value of the human person directly to be assessed in dollars
or otherwise quantified as expendable in a master calculus of social
utility. On this basis, the law may prohibit money passing hands or
the enforcement of contracts, either for custody of a child or
termination of a natural parent's rights.
A respect for the family that properly balances the importance of
formal legal requirements with that of the normativity of sex and
procreation; a respect for the dignity of the individual person; and
public morality-such are the generic goals, then, which ethics proposes
for the civil law, as it responds to the practice of hired maternity.
And, yet, the evaluation of particular legislative proposals in the
light of these generic goals stands in need of further mediation by
political prudence. According to St. Thomas, the rule of law is
grounded primarily in the free and reasonable appropriation of those
governed, the force of coercion being available in the marginal case
to bring the bad man into compliance with external order. 40 Given
the moral tenor of the particular society, the question for prudential
judgment is how best to draw lines effectuating laws based both in
39. As reflected, for example, in the thirteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
40. Summa Theologica, 1.11. Q.96, art. 4 and 5, pp. 1019-1021.

204

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990)

the objective requirements of justice and public order and in the free
affirmation of the populace. The lawmaker must decide what indirect
moral harms, perversely following from the pursuit of any one aspect
of the good under the circumstances, may outweigh the good which
legal intervention intends. He or she must also ask how the generic
goals prescribed by ethics can be effectively communicated within
the existing categories of the legal culture.
More concretely, the task of political prudence is to select the best
means towards realizing the generic goals of lawmaking, under the
conditions prevailing in a particular legal system. A number of
concrete objectives present themselves in the setting of hired maternity,
as possible means for realizing the relevant generic goals described
above. These objectives ought to be considered in an order of
descending importance in relation to two factors: the importance of
the particular aspect of the societal good to be attained, and likelihood
of success. In the order accordingly assigned such intermediate
objectives here may be said to include:
1. Nonenforcement of hired maternity contracts upon avoidance
by the gestational mother;
2. The prohibition of fees for delivering custody of an infant;
3. The prohibition of fees for terminating parental rights;
4. The parens patriae right of the state to intervene in custody
allocations to safeguard the welfare of affected children;
5. The prohibition of advertising and brokerage that serves to
induce participation in hired maternity arrangements;
6. The prohibition of procreation by partners who are not in a
legally cognizable marriage, or at least a de facto monogamous
heterosexual relationship; and
7. The prohibition of procreating or gestating a child for the
purpose of yielding custody to another.
A morally sound legislative response to hired maternity will advance
the generic goals set out above, but it will do so through the prudent
application of some or all of these intermediate objectives, as prevailing
circumstances make appropriate.
III.

EMERGING LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS FOR A RESPONSE TO HIRED
MATERNITY

As far as practicable, legal proposals should adopt conceptual
starting points already available within existing law, especially perhaps
when offered from specifically moral conviction. Recommendations
for legal responses to hired maternity, which are grounded in ethics,
ought inductively to seek out the foundations for an ethically sound
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approach which already may be present in the law. The New Jersey
Supreme Court opinion in In re Baby M 41 represents both the most
authoritative and best reasoned legal analysis on how the existing
law in a typical American jurisdiction should be read to govern the
practice of hired maternity. In the context at hand, therefore, the
New Jersey opinion is an appropriate departure point for considering
reform.
IN RE BABY M
The New Jersey High Court ruled unenforceable the terms of the
Whitehead-Stern contract providing for allocation of custody rights,
and for termination of the natural mother's parental rights. 42 The
court concluded that the custody provision was unenforceable under
the state's policy against exchanging money for the right to rear a
child. The court found that such a policy derived from the New
43
Jersey anti-baby-selling law enacted to end black-market adoption.
It concluded that the contractual provision terminating Whitehead's
parental rights was unenforceable by reason as well of a second state
policy restricting the termination of parental rights to cases of prior
parens patriae determination of abandonment or unfitness on the
part of the natural parent."
41. Matter of Baby "M", 109 N.J. 396 (1988).
42. 109 N.J. at 423-25, 434-44.
43. 109 N. J. at 425-44.
44. Matter of Baby "M", 109 N.J. at 452, n. 16. This text is important and
worthy of complete citation here:
If the legislature were to enact a statute providing for enforcement of surrogacy
agreements, the validity of such a statute might depend on this strength of the
state interest in making it more likely that infertile couples will be able to adopt
children. As a value, it is obvious that the interest is strong; but if, as plaintiffs
assert, ten to fifteen percent of all couples are infertile, the interest is of
enormous strength. This figure is given both by counsel for the Stems and by
the trial court [citation deleted]. We have been unable to find reliable confirmation of this statistic, however, and we are not confident of its accuracy. We
note that at least one source asserts that in 1982, the rate of married couples
who were both childless and infertile was only 5.8% [citation deleted].
On such quantitative differences, constitutional validity can depend, where the
statute in question is justified as serving a compelling state interest. The quality
of the interference with the parents' right of companionship bears on these
issues: if a statute, like the surrogacy contract before us, made the consent
given prior to conception irrevocable, it might be regarded as a greater interference with the fundamental right than a statute that gave effect only to a
consent executed, for instance, more than 6 months after the child's birth.
There is an entire spectrum of circumstances that strengthens or weakens the
fundamental rights involved and a similar spectrum of state interests that justifies
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It should be apparent that the New Jersey holding satisfies a
number of the intermediate objectives proposed above for a sound
legal response to hired maternity. Although binding only in New
Jersey, the holding will be persuasive elsewhere because of the prestige
of the New Jersey Court. However, the New Jersey opinion itself
gives notice that it is no ground for complacency, since it grants that
the policies on which it rests can be altered by legislation.
Constitutional argument may provide little brake in how far legislatures
45
might go in this regard.
At present, legislative proposals are being tested before courts and
legislatures around the United States which would affirm, strengthen,

or does not justify particular restrictions on that right. We do not believe it
would be wise for this court to attempt to identify various combinations of
circumstances and interests and attempt to indicate which combinations might
and which might not constitutionally permit termination of parental rights.
We will say this much, however: a parent's fundamental right to the companionship of one's child can be significantly eroded by that parent's consent to
the surrender of that child. That surrender, if voluntary and knowingly made,
may reduce the strength of that fundamental right to the point where a statute
awarding custody and all parental rights to the adoptive couple, would be valid.
Further, the threshold of constitutional protection might not be reached if the court
held that enforcement of the contract was not even state action under Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 151, n. 15.
45. Commentary on developments in reproductive technology and the law has
sought to distinguish the various conceptual models available for a legislative
response. Generally, such attempts have not succeeded in identifying the truly salient
differences among approaches. The report of the United States Office of Technology
Assessment identifies them as "static, private ordering, inducement, regulatory, and
punitive." United States Office of Technology Assessment, Infertility: Medical and
Social Choices, (1988), p. 269. The Ontario Law Reform Commission identifies
alternatives as "private ordering," "state regulation," and "hybrid" or "flexible."
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Human Artificial Reproduction and
Related Matters, (1985), p. 130 [hereinafter Ontario Law Reform Commission]. The
University of Virginia's Walter Wadlington suggests the following division: (1) static;
(2) private ordering; or (3) state regulation. Wadlington, "Artificial Conception:
The Challenge for Family Law," 69 U. Va. L. Rev. (1983), pp. 465, 496-97. These
schematizations revolve around supposedly germane distinctions between status quo
and progress and between government intervention and private choice. There is not
space here to develop why these distinctions are less than satisfactory. For an
alternate taxonomy, see Wagner, "The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative
Resources and Parental Rights: The Natfiral Endowment Critique," 40 Case W. Res
(1990), p. 1. Suffice it, for the purposes of the present discussion, to say, with
respect to the first distinction, that the balance between permanence and change
which is always necessary in law is a purely formal dichotomy which has nothing
to offer by way of substantive direction, and, with respect to the second, that the
distinction between state regulation and private choice does not go deep enough,
since both approaches entail the use of governmental coercion against individual
claims.
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or reverse the policies on which the New Jersey Court based its
decision. These proposals can be classed as falling into four types:
(1) prohibition; (2) decommercialization; (3) approval with
governmental validation; and (4) approval with "private ordering"
validation. The momentary legal stasis centering on In re Baby M
can be expected to dissolve and re-form according to one of these
four approaches, once the matter has been evaluated or adjudicated
by state legislatures, Congress, and the United States Supreme Court.
FouR

AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES FOR SHAPING THE LEGISLATIVE

RESPONSE TO HIRED MATERNITY

1.

PROHIBITION

An outright prohibition of the alienation of maternity, whether on
a commercial or altruistic basis, would fulfill all the concrete policy
objectives enumerated above. Without consulting prudential
considerations, this option could be viewed as the one to be preferred
among those available. Arguably, it could be considered the response
the final section of the Vatican Instruction recommends.4 The option
has analogies in the existing criminal prohibitions still to be found
in many jurisdictions against bigamy, adultery, fornication, and
47
sodomy.
The Catholic view of civil law does not require such a strong
response. The civil law trend is against such prohibitions in other
areas of sex-related conduct. Outright prohibition would tend to
offend contemporary American sensibilities about personal freedom
and privacy. Practically speaking, the ban would be virtually
unenforceable." This option stands little chance of being adopted in
any American jurisdiction. Even if it were so enacted, it might well
be overturned by the United States Supreme Court.
46. "Legislation must also prohibit, by virtue of the support which is due to
the family . . . 'surrogate motherhood'." Vatican Instruction, p. 20.
47. See Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Part II (1980), p. 430. The
constitutionality of such laws was upheld over arguments that they were invalid in
view of the procreative liberty espoused in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and
in Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
48. In Maryland, for instance, S.B. 795 (sponsored by State Senator Stone prior
to June 1988) and S.B. 613 (sponsored by State Senator Mitchell prior to June
1987) were apparently general prohibitions that died without legislative enactment.
National Committee for Adoption, 1988 State Legislative Activity Regarding "Surrogate Parenting" (June 1988); National Committee for Adoption, 1987 State
Legislative Activity Regarding "Surrogate Parenting" (June 1987).
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DECOMMERCIALZATION

The weak form of decommercialization is seen in the responses to
hired maternity of such jurisdictions as Louisiana and Nebraska. 49
Its typical effect is to make contracts alienating maternity void and
unenforceable. Some proposals are varied to make such contracts
merely voidable at the instance of the gestational mother.5 0
Commissioning parties are, in either case, denied certainty and
predictability, since they are denied legal enforcement of the expectancy
created by the gestational mother's promise to perform. There can
be little question that such a measure would discourage the market
for alienated maternity and significantly reduce the incidence of the
practice. Importantly, it would also withhold at least some measure
of symbolic approval that would otherwise flow from the legal
enforcement of the contract.
Under this approach, some hired maternity transactions would
continue to go forward, and some money would regularly be exchanged
for children and for the termination of parental rights. In cases
involving no appearance of legally coerced performance, such
transactions could be viewed as implicitly validated by the state since
the state would do nothing to suppress them, notwithstanding its
parens patriae responsibility for the welfare of children. In the long
run, decommercialization in its weak form is likely to evolve further
and to become decommercialization in its strong form or to unravel
and become outright approval. The weak form of decommercialization
probably does not present a stable option.
Like the typical weak-form version of decommercialization, the
strong form makes hired maternity contracts void and unenforceable.
But, unlike the weak, the strong prohibits even the voluntary exchange
of monetary compensation for the contemporaneous alienation of
maternity, and it adds significant criminal penalties for attempting
to enter or broker such contracts on a commercial basis. This
legislative option does not prohibit the alienation of maternity on an
altruistic basis, nor does it attempt to limit human conception to the
confines of marriage. Still, it does more than merely passively withhold
state enforcement from private contract, actively imposing negative
sanctions for attempts to commercialize human reproduction. The
49. Nebraska Legislative Bill No. 674 (July 8, 1988); Louisiana Act No. 583
(R.S. 2713) (Sept. 1, 1987).
50. This approach is reflected, for example, in the judicial holding of Surrogate
Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ex rel. Armstrong, 704
S.W.2d 209, 213 (1986).
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option appears to offer a workable middle ground avoiding what
some might perceive as undue conflict with personal privacy, while
nonetheless drawing a bright line between the sphere of market
transactions and that of those intimate relationships necessary to the
nurturance and dignity of human persons.
The Michigan law on hired maternity is an example of the strong
form of decommercialization. 5 1 Its enactment appears to represent
the best available legal response to hired maternity, when measured
against the generic goals appropriate to lawmaking considered above.
It incidentally appears to satisfy the essential legislative
52
recommendation on hired maternity found in the Vatican Instruction.

3.

APPROVAL wiTH GOVERNMENTAL VALIDATION

A third option for responding to hired maternity is approval with
governmental validation. For an example of this option, one can
turn to a recent uniform statute, promulgated by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which, in the
first of two alternate suggested forms, institutionalizes the commercial
alienation of maternity. The title of the statute is the Uniform Status
of Children of Assisted Conception Act [hereinafter Uniform Act]."
The relevant alternate form is entitled "Alternate A."' 54 In contrast
to any of the three particular approaches mentioned so farprohibition, and the weak or strong forms of decommercializationall of which are at least arguably acceptable from the ethical perspective

51. Sections 1-13 of P.A. 199 of Michigan Public Acts of 1988. The same
approach is seen in the report of the New York State Cuomo Commission. See
Proposed Surrogate Parenting Act, in The New York State Task Force on Life and
the Law, Surrogate Parenting:Analysis and Recommendations for Public Policy A1 (1988). It is also evident in the federal legislation sponsored in 1987 by Rep.
Thomas Luken. H.R. 4233, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 14, 1987).
52. Whether my recommendation fulfills the recommendation of the Vatican
Instruction depends, in part, on what its drafters meant by "prohibit." The Vatican
Instruction does concede that "[the civil law] must sometimes tolerate, for the sake
of public order, things that it cannot forbid without a greater evil resulting." Vatican
Instruction, p. 20. This would seem to be a basis for moderating the measure of
prohibition in the present context. Whether my recommendation fulfills the directive
may also be made to turn on the definition of "surrogate motherhood," a term the
Vatican Instruction uses but never defines. If the Vatican Instruction means "commercial surrogacy" or "hired maternity" in a strict sense, then the recommendation
made here is in full accord with the directive.
53. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (typescript and without prefatory
note and comments) (approved and recommended for enactment in all the states,
Aug. 1988) [hereinafter Uniform Act].
54. Ibid., pp. 3-9.
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delineated in the earlier sections of this article, the Conference of
Commissioners' approach is morally unacceptable.
The Uniform Act essentially adopts the scheme developed in about
half of the American states over the past thirty years for dealing
with Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID).15 Its underlying premises
are that parentage can be grounded apart from genetic contribution
and can be made to devolve from governmental conferral. The
application of this framework in the setting of hired maternity follows
the recommendation of the Ontario Law Reform Commission. 56 Its
extension to cover the legal implications of the gestational role makes
governmental conferral even more unambiguously the source of
parental rights, than do existing enactments on AID.
The Uniform Act requires judicial approval of the hired maternity
contract in advance of conception.5 7 Once the contract has been
approved and conception occurs, and as long as the gestational
mother fails to exercise a limited right to terminate the agreement,
the commissioning couple is irrevocably granted parental rights in
the child conceived. 58 Notwithstanding her lack of genetic, gestational,
or nurturing relationship with the child'at the time of the grant, the
wife of the genetic father of the child is equally vested with such
rights. They are acquired well in advance of childbirth and, thus,
suffice to override the wishes of the gestational mother, even while
she continues in a de facto relationship of nurturance with the child
in her womb.
Although concern for the welfare of the adult parties and the child
in prospect may explain the Conference's requirement of advance
judicial validation of the contract, its unfortunate consequence is
further to accentuate governmental conferral as the basis of parental
rights. The status conferred includes not just that of parenthood,
but also that of "surrogate" and even "nonparent. ' 59 Under the

55. E.g., Unif. ParentageAct, Sect. 5, 9A U.L.A. 592-93 (1979). For suggested
relevance of this AID approach to other reproductive technologies, see Krause,
"Artificial Conception: Legislative Approaches," 19 Far. Law. Q. (1985), pp. 185,
194. For a critique of the approach, see Annas, "Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the
Best Interests of the Sperm Donor," 14 Far. Law. Q. (1980), p. 1.
56. Ontario Law Reform Commission, pp. 3-4.
57. Uniform Act., pp. 3-4.
58. Ibid., pp. 7, 8.
59. The Uniform Act provides that a "donor is not the parent of a child
conceived through assisted conception," p. 2, "a person who dies before a conception
using his sperm or her egg is not a parent of any resulting child born of the
conception," Ibid., and "the surrogate and her husband, if any, are not parents
..
." p. 8.
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scheme envisioned, some number of women are officially approved
by the state as "surrogates" and their relationships, as such, with
sperm donors or sperm owners are officially formalized. 60 At the
same time, these women are negatively defined under law, as the
"nonparents" of the children they bear. In effect, this legislation
modifies American marriage law to encompass not only marriage as
it has existed under received law, but also a subordinate form of
"marriage" with the content of reproductive concubinage. The
Uniform Act represents a radical revision of American marriage and
family law.
The Conference gives the gestational mother a right to terminate
the contractual relationship up until roughly six months of gestation. 6
While they intend this provision to mitigate the objectification or
reification of the gestational mother that would be incurred through
the involuntary enforcement of the contract, the provision actually
further underscores conferral by the state as the basis of parental
rights. Ostensibly, the six-months cutoff flows from a corresponding
legal right the gestational mother presumably has under Roe v. Wade
to abort a baby up until six months gestation, notwithstanding a
contrary prior contractual promise by her. 62 The Conference appears
to see a shelter for the right to preserve parental rights in the mother's
nearly absolute right under existing law to decide the survival of the

60. "A surrogate who has provided the egg for the assisted conception pursuant
to an approved agreement may terminate the agreement by filing written notice
with the court within 180 days after the last insemination pursuant to the
agreement. Upon finding . . . that the surrogate has voluntarily terminated the
... agreement ... the court shall vacate the order ....
The surrogate incurs
no liability to the intended parents for exercising her right of termination. If
the court vacates the order . . . the surrogate is the mother of the resulting
child, and her husband, if a party to the agreement is the father." Ibid., p. 78.
61. In the draft originally considered by the Conference, as it met to vote on
the act, the Comment to the sections on hired maternity noted that "the six-month
period was selected to track, as closely as possible, the Supreme Court's decision in
Roe v. Wade. Just as a pregnant woman can choose to abort during the first two
terms of pregnancy, the statute permits the surrogate to choose to "keep" the child
she is bearing during the first six months." National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, Status of Children of the New Biology (draft for approval)
(July 1988), p. 10.
62. The act provides that "adequate provision must be made" under the contract
for "all reasonable health care costs associated with the surrogacy" and that "unless
otherwise provided in the surrogacy agreement, all court costs, counsel fees, and
other costs and expenses associated with the hearing shall be assessed against the
intended parents." Uniform Act, pp. 5-6. The statute does not prohibit additional
fees beyond these mandatory costs.
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fetus during the first six months of gestation. Yet, the deadline for
the exercise of the abortion right, no less than the deadline for the
exercise of the right to revoke waiver of parental rights under the
uniform law's hired maternity provisions, exists strictly as a matter
of governmental conferral.
The Uniform Act sets the coercive force of law against the natural
bond which the gestational mother may come to recognize as morally
normative during the crucial third trimester of pregnancy, a period
which includes the most vigorous and conscious bodily interaction
between mother and child prior to birth and which also represents
the most socially manifest phase of pregnancy, since at this stage the
expectant mother's condition is readily apparent to those about her.
Similarly, the maternal-infant relationship is made void of normative
significance as a matter of law at a point prior to childbirth, a
potentially life-threatening event that offers profoundly interpersonal,
reciprocally traumatic, if on balance gratifying contact between mother
and child generally conducive of bonding. Finally, the mother is
deprived of the perspective of a return to postpartum hormonal and
physical equilibrium from which to assess her own wishes regarding
her relationship with this irreplaceable child whom she had not
encountered ex utero at the time the court approved the contract.
The Uniform Act permits the payment of money for the right to
rear a child and the receipt of the same for the termination of
parental rights. The judicial control which the Uniform Act mandates
for such transactions may constitute implicit recognition that such
exchanges are a threat to the dignity and well being of children and
others. But it merely elevates the authority of the state, without
succeeding in securing the dignity of human persons. To the contrary,
the statute implicitly rejects the inherent dignity of the person and
of basic human relationships and substitutes valuations contingent
on positive conferral by the state.
When informed international opinion is consulted, the
Commissioners' approach would appear to have little chance of
achieving enactment, for the present, anywhere other than in North
America. 63 In Canada and the United States, this and other serious
proposals of the kind have been advanced. If they are adopted in
these North American countries, they might, in view of the influence
of North American culture eventually find a reception elsewhere.
63. See e.g., Department of Health & Social Security (U.K.), Report of the
Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology (M. Warnock
Chair) (1984), p. 47.

WILLIAM JOSEPH WAGNER
Considering the stature of the National Conference of Commissioners
and the purely technical appeal of the Conference's legal drafting,
the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act stands
as perhaps the most serious risk of an ethically flawed legislative
response to hired maternity.
4.

APPROVAL wrTH VALIDATION BY PRrVATE ORDERING

In its extreme form, the legal option of approving hired maternity
based on a validation in "private ordering," as recommended by
commentators like Judge Posner of the United States Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals" and the University of Texas' Professor John
Robertson," appears to call for free alienation, by contract, of
virtually all aspects of parental rights, at least up through birth.
Whether based on the model of abortion rights as in Robertson, or
law and economics as in Posner, this approach, in theory, supplants
the family with shifting, legally enforceable contract relationships.
Contractual intention replaces nature as the source of rights and
duties. Under this option the family dissolves into the marketplace
of atomistic individuals. Although often overlooked by proponents,
a necessary corollary of the approach is that persons be treated as
property, whether as raw materials or finished product. The enactment
of this extreme form of the option appears unlikely at present.
The private ordering option exists as well in a more moderate
form, which does not subject family ties to untrammeled market
exchanges, but allows the market to operate only to a restricted
degree. Such moderate forms of the private ordering option, still
objectionable from an ethical perspective, stand in some jeopardy of
being enacted. An example of this qualified form of private ordering
was seen in the proposal promulgated by the American Bar Association
Section on Family Law. The ABA Family Law Section's proposal,
ultimately rejected by the ABA House of Delegates, was known as
the Model Surrogacy Act (Model Act)." This legislative proposal can
64. Posner, "The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate
Motherhood," 5 J. Cont. Health Law & Pol'y, p. 21; Posner, "The Regulation of
the Market in Adoptions," 67 Boston U. L. Rev. (1987), p. 59; Landes & Posner
"The Economics of the Baby Shortage," 7 J. Legal Stud. (1978), p. 323.
65. Robertson, "Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure
of the New Reproduction," 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. (1986), p. 942; Robertson, "Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth," 69 Va.
L. Rev. (1983), p. 405.
66. Section of Family Law Adoption Committee and Ad Hoc Surrogacy Committee, "Draft ABA Model Surrogacy Act," 22 Faro. Law. Q. (1988), p. 123
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be characterized as private ordering within a consumer protection
framework.
The Model Act makes freedom of contract, at least where validated
by reference to reproductive choice, its justifying ground. In this
respect, the work of John Robertson seems to lend the most plausible
theoretical basis for what the Model Act contains. 6 At the same
time, the drafters restrict freedom of contract for certain paternalistic
goals. They wish to protect the child in prospect from being reared
in an unfit family.6 They desire to protect the "surrogate" from
uninformed consent, and to provide her with minimal employment
conditions and benefits. 69 They aim to keep the price of "surrogacy"
services to an affordable minimum, and to avoid the financial
70
exploitation of the commissioning couple.
[hereinafter Model Act]. The Model Act was approved by the Council of the
American Bar Association's Section of Family Law, at its January 1988 meeting. It
was rejected by the ABA House of Delegates in February 1989; during the same
meeting, the ABA House of Delegates voted to endorse the National Conference of
Commissioners' Uniform Act.
67. Section 1 of the Model Act states that its purposes include, among others,
to "facilitate private reproductive choices by effectuating the parties' intentions
while minimizing the risks to the parties." Ibid., p. 125.
68. The Model Act provides that:
[blefore the insemination and not more than one year before the insemination,
the intended parents shall be examined by a certified or registered social worker
who shall obtain a complete social history of the intended parents and determine
whether the intended parents appear to be suited to going through the process
of having a child through surrogacy and raising a child born of a surrogacy
agreement. Ibid., p. 129.
69. The Model Act stipulates that:

[b]efore the insemination and not more than 18 months before the insemination,
the surrogate shall be examined by a licensed or registered mental health
practitioner ....

The licensed or registered mental health practitioner shall

examine the surrogate to determine whether, to a reasonable degree of psychiatric
or psychological certainty the surrogate ...

is mentally and emotionally capable

of entering into a surrogacy agreement. Ibid., p. 128-29.
The Model Act also requires that "[b]efore the insemination the surrogate shall be
examined by a certified or registered social worker who shall obtain a complete
social history of the prospective surrogate and determine whether the prospective
surrogate appears to be suited to being a surrogate." Ibid., p. 129.
70. The Model Act specifies that:
the minimum and maximum fee to be paid to the surrogate shall be determined
by an administrative body of three persons, called the ... Surrogacy Fee
Agency. The . . .Surrogacy Fee Agency shall not set the minimum fee at less
than $7,500. The maximum fee shall not be more than $12,500 .... The
surrogacy agreement may, however, waive the payment of a fee . . . if the

surrogate is related to the intended parents or if [t]hey have known each other
for a period of more than three years ..
Ibid., p. 125.

WILLIAM JOSEPH WAGNER
The private ordering provided for under the Model Act is far from
a validation of the classic nineteenth century notion of freedom of
contract. It represents freedom of contract within the limits of the
new feudalism, according to which transactions are mass produced;
the level of risk which the parties are permitted to assume is strictly
allocated, and entitlements are distributed according to consumer
71
welfare.
Once the gestational mother has entered the "surrogacy" track by
being certified as "suited to be a surrogate" and by conceiving a
child, this scheme does not prevent her from aborting the baby under
a constitutionally recognized abortion right, but it deprives her of
any right to change her mind about relinquishing custody of a child
born alive. She is subject to the specific enforcement of her promise
to deliver her child. 72 Although the Model Act technically requires
that the commissioning parties receive a psychologist's approval
before being eligible to rear the resulting child, the fact is inescapable
73
that this scheme makes the baby a fit object of mercantile exchange.
The effect of the Model Act is to commodify women and children.
Against this backdrop, the ABA Family Law Section's Model
Surrogacy Act's consumer-protection safeguards ring hollow. This
draft law is at home in empowering certain classes and subordinating
others. It is a cynical and poorly drafted proposal, which, if enacted,
would contribute to a grotesquely alienated society.
IV.

CONCLUSION

From the ethical perspective that has been developed here, the
practice of hired maternity is, like human slavery, always and
everywhere morally objectionable. The viewpoint espoused has been
expressly identified as Roman Catholic. Some of its basic terms have
been articulated with assistance from the Vatican Instruction on
Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of
Procreation. Yet, the perspective advanced is grounded in human
reason and is addressed to all in the political community. Ultimately,
what this article advocates is not its distinctive ethical methodology,
71. See generally M. Glendon, The New Family and the New Property (1981).
72. If she aborts when not "medically necessary," however, she will be liable
to the "intended parents" for money damages. Ibid., p. 133. The Model Act
provides that "[a]fter the child is born, either of the parties shall have the right to
specific performance, that is, the right to have the court order and enforce the
delivery of the child to the intended parent or parents." Ibid., p. 133.
73. For a discussion of the concept of commodification, see Radin "Market
Inalienability," 100 Harvard L. Rev. (1987), p. 1849.
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but a proposal that the political community join together, from its
varied moral perspectives, in adopting a legal response to hired
maternity, which preserves the normative value of the human family
and of the human person as fundamental to the public order of
society, and which otherwise supports a minimal fabric of public
morality.

